The Barnett hypotheses #4

[Aside: The use of the term 'performative' in the above thesis appears to rely on a reference to Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition. Thus,

"in public policy, the student has been constructed as an acting being rather than a cognitive being. Arguably, this has paid off for we have seen over the last 30 years or so – in the UK at least – the emergence of what might be termed ‘the performative student’ (cf. Lyotard 1984)." (Barnett, 2009: 430)

As has been argued elsewhere, cf Postmodern un-conditionally, Lyotard conflates 'performativity' and 'productivity'. Barnett's thesis seems to depend on that reduction for its rhetorical force. Otherwise, the notion of 'the performative student' is open to senses other than that of 'the productive student' (whose productivity can be harnessed and increased), which weakens the force of the rhetorical opposition. 

This reduction makes it harder to comprehend the possibility that 'knowing' might be considered a form of action (or a set of forms of action) - in the world, in relation to others. It also glosses over the valuable uses of the term 'performative' that have developed since its inception in the 1950s by J. L. Austin, who, as an Oxford don, was a long way from concerning himself with students' productivity [1] (see the end of The Barnett hypotheses #2 for references to such uses as have developed).

In short, the problems with the thesis as formulated are: 

• the characterisation of knowing solely as the cognitive grasping of conventional, academic, propositional knowledge; 
• the reduction of the category of the performative to that of productivity (following Lyotard); and 
• the opposition between the cognitive and the performative (understood as productivity). 

All three aspects are unsatisfactory.]

[Aside. This second thesis is very problematic. Putting aside the question of whether the above summary accurately represents the thesis, the cognitive, intellectual practices outlined by Barnett do not seem to guarantee the development of the (behavioural) dispositions and qualities, or 'epistemic virtues’, listed, i.e. "courage, resilience, carefulness, integrity, self-discipline, restraint, respect for others, openness, generosity, authenticity". (Barnett, 2009: 434)

These very same disciplinary processes might easily lead to the formation of other qualities and dispositions, such as intolerance, closedness, hostility, defensiveness and bumptiousness. There seems no necessity that such processes lead one to understand "the practices of knowing in being" (Barad 2003: 829). Nor do they seem especially suited to dealing with super-complexity. They may even be better suited to addressing the issues arising from the kind of complexity generated by bureaucracy, for example, how to maintain divisions (among disciplines, between theory and practice, between pure and applied, between academic and support staff, among organisations, among institutions, among nations, and so on) and hierarchies (of disciplines, of roles within disciplines, of publications, of organisations (universities) within an institution (higher education).]

"Wittgenstein's intensely serious and often pessimistic approach to both life and philosophy contrasted sharply with Austin's pervasive gaiety. Austin developed his ideas in Oxford, frequently over lively unstructured discussions with his students that took place each Saturday morning. They would often search the Oxford English Dictionary for interesting verbs and consider their uses."